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Abstract. Process  management  allows  for  the  automated  coordination  of
processes  involving human and computer  actors.  In  modern economies it  is
increasingly needed for this coordination to be not only within organizations but
also to cross organizational boundaries. The dependence on the performance of
other organizations should however be limited, and the control over the own
processes is required from a competitiveness perspective. Overall, this indicates
a federated process management approach instead of a centralized one. This
paper  analyses  the resilience of  automated process  management  overall  and
especially how the use of federated process management impacts that resilience.
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1 Introduction
Collaborative networks as a relative new scientific discipline [13] have been applied
to application areas such as Factories of the Future [14], Manufacturing and logistics
networks  [15].  Organizations,  enterprises,  and  communities  are  interconnected  by
networks  in  the  new application  areas.  To support  such  collaboration  in  a  hyper-
connected world, existing technologies need to be improved and adapted in terms of
larger  scale  integration  and  more  intelligent  devices,  sensors  and  cyber-physical
systems involvement.
The scope of business collaborations can be limited to a particular department in an
enterprise,  it  may  span  multiple  divisions  within  an  enterprise  or  it  may  require
interenterprise collaboration. In this research, we are especially considering how to
manage  interenterprise  collaboration,  i.e.  collaborative  business  processes  are
executed among enterprises. In this work, we consider that (web) services and human
interactions  are  coordinated  through an automated  process  management  system to
form an SOA. In a traditional  approach,  the process  management  system forms a
single point of failure. We defining resilience as the degree as to which the system can
continue  to  meet  its  goals  in  the  presence  of  errors.  Based  upon  an  analysis  of
different  structures  for  federation  we  have  analyzed  how  process  federation  can
impact overall system resilience.
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In  this  paper  we  focus  on  federated  control  of  collaborative  business  process
systems as well as analysis of resilience related the federated collaborative business
process systems. Federation in this context is the coordination of the execution of
individual business process instances by multiple independent process engines. In the
next  section,  we  review  challenges  of  collaborative  networks  and  collaborative
business process managements, federated control of information systems, large-scale
systems, business process management systems/business services, and cloud services.
In Section 3,  different  management  types  of  federated  collaborative  processes  are
classified. Resilience of the federated collaborative processes is reviewed in Section
4. The paper is end with a summary of the paper and future research.  
2 Related Work
Increasing importance  of  value chains  and production networks,  of interconnected
organizations,  collaboration dynamics,  outsourcing,  and the increasing  potential  of
new ICT technologies  supported  innovations  has  driven  research  of  collaborative
networks [12].   Collaborative networks [6] [13] and collaborative business process
management [11] [12] have been fostered by globalization over decades.
Federated  control  method  has  been  applied  into  different  areas.  Federated
information  management  architecture  is  provided  to  manage  information  across
different organizations in virtual organization domain [3]. Different management level
schemas of federated databases are specified for interoperation. 
Systems control is another research area which federated control methods has been
applied  [6].  In  this  area,  large-scale  systems  normally  consist  of  several
interconnected local systems, which conventional centralized control schemes are not
suitable  for  due  to  global  dynamic  behavior  complexity  and  computational
difficulties.  Many  multi-agent  based  federated  control  systems  are  used  to  high
performance computing area. Federated Cloud Services [8] [9] [10] emerges recently
to deploy and to manage multiple external and internal cloud computing services for
meeting business needs. 
Paper  [16]  proposes  a  framework  to  create  enterprise  resilience  using  service
oriented  architecture  approach.  Antunes  and  Mourão  consider  a  framework  and
related services for building resilient business process management [17]. Both works
are  not  look  at  resilience  of  collaborative  systems.  Previous  work  on  federated
business process management [1] [2] [5] are proposed to handle the dynamic nature of
collaborations among autonomous enterprises, which different structures are specified
for different interactions among business partners. 
Today  we  are  facing  to  support  enterprises’ agility  and  resilience  in  turbulent
business  environments  [4].  Advances  in  ICT, Internet,  and  cloud  have  led  to  the
explosion  of  collaborative  networks  both  people  and  organizational  levels.  A
pervasive  interconnection of  and collaboration among physical  and virtual  objects
provides  opportunities  of  realization  of  manufacturing  2.0  (industrial  4.0)  and
sustainable  development.  Our  previous  work  [7]  provides  a  method  to  analyze
resilience of a cloud-based collaborative process solution. We thus review federated
collaborative process management and analyzing resilience of federated collaborative
process management in the new context.     
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3 Federated Collaborative Process Systems
Processes that involve multiple parties may be collaborative. While it is possible for
this to be limited to two parties, generally one would expect more than two parties.
Various  degrees  of  collaborativeness  can  be  distinguished.  At  the  lowest  level  of
collaborativeness, collaborative processes have little differences to distinguish them
from  simple  provision  of  (web)  services.  At  the  highest  end  there  are  complex
interactions between the involved parties.
In addition to degrees of collaborativeness, there is the dimension of balance of
power or control. Collaborations with dominant partners, as for example occurs in
supplier networks for large manufacturers of cars or airplanes, are quite different from
more peer-to-peer oriented collaborations where no partner is dominant.
3.1 Collaborative Processes
In terms of process management,  it  is convenient to make the distinction between
service provision/consumption on the one hand and collaboration on the other hand.
Starting from the precept that all processes have a single initiator, a process can be
seen as collaborative if, at operational level (not purely on an intellectual basis with
human  owners)  the  initiator  and  executor  have  some  awareness  of  each  other's
process and use this in some aspects of operations. The use of process nature can be
limited,  for  example  to  monitoring,  but  there  should  be  some use  of  the  process
nature.
In real terms we primarily consider automated processes that are managed through
some  form  of  workflow  or  business  process  management  system.  In  this  digital
representation a process is represented as control flow as well  as activities whose
interaction is managed in line with the control flow to provide the process outcomes.
Please note, that in this context we look at logical uniqueness and do not consider
load balancing or replication of services or process management systems.
Centralised Process Management
 Traditionally  process  choreography  is  seen  as  performed  by  a  single  process
management system (or process engine). This system has a full view of the process
and all components. In case that external components are involved, they are treated
opaquely as service consumption where the system itself has no further knowledge of
the underlying processes or possible interactions.
In  this  scenario,  collaborative  process  management  would  imply  that  the
management  system  requires  quite  some  insight  into  and  control  over  the
implementation  of  activities  within  the  collaborating  organizations.  While  cloud
computing makes this somewhat easier, many collaborators  may object  to this.  In
most cases,  tight contractual arrangements are needed to allow this to happen [11]
[12], and this is mainly seen in a context with dominant players.
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3.2 Federated process management
Federated processes are distinguished from centralized process management in that
process-aware  collaboration  occurs,  but  is  controlled  by  multiple  autonomous
management entities. While federated process execution is normal when processes are
managed and executed by humans (each person manages his own actions within the
agreed  boundaries),  such  coordination  is  not  the  norm  for  automated  process
management.
Federation as concept implies that there is some degree of meta-level coordination
between the management agents that perform the service choreographies. Considering
multiple copies of the same process  (description) to be the same process  (model),
multiple instances  of a single process  model can, from a technical  perspective,  be
instantiated  on/coordinated  by  different  management  systems.  For  overall
management it is however worthwhile that meta-information is coordinated to allow
for  overall  statistics.  Each  process  instance  should  have  a  single,  eventually
consistent, state.
When parts of a process are coordinated by different process management systems
in a federation, there are different ways this can be organized. In this paper we only
consider those approaches where at any point of time there is a single "master" or
"owner" of the process instance. The coordination of a subset of the activities can be
delegated  to  a  different  management  engine.  Ownership  may  also  be  transferred
(voluntarily or in response to failure). While many real-world process would consist
of combinations of these (descriptive) classifications, it is still worthwhile to consider
them separately.
Hierarchical federated processes
 Within federated process management, some processes are purely hierarchical. This
means that the process is designed such that process instances are primarily managed
by a single management system that delegates parts of the execution to other process
management  systems  under  control  of  a  different  collaborator.  If  we  define  an
execution domain as those parts of a process managed and choreographed by a single
management system, hierarchical federation is defined through a strict hierarchy of
execution domains.
An example of a hierarchical federated process setup could be where a cooperative
of  specialized  manufacturing  companies  is  set  up  as  collaborative  network
organization  to  be  able  to  deliver  more  end-to-end  solutions.  As  part  of  this
collaborative network some centralized coordination is required and can be provided
and  managed  by  the  cooperative.  Individual  manufacturers  would  however  retain
control over their own processes, but the overall process would be managed by the
master process management system.
Sequential federated processes
 A sequential federated process is a process where there is a clear transition from one
locus of control to another, after which the original execution domain is no longer
involved in the choreography of the process. Effectively this means that responsibility
and control can be transferred.
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Free-form federated processes
 In many cases, a strict hierarchy of execution domains is a significant restriction and
sequential federation is also not applicable. Free-form federated processes as such are
those  processes  where  there  are  no  restrictions  are  set  on  the  relations  between
execution domains.
4 Collaborative Network Resilience
In determining resilience of a process system within a collaborative network it is first
of all of import to define what degrees of resilience are considered. In this sense we
only consider  the  resilience  of  the system, not  the  resilience  of  the  network as  a
whole.
Resilience of a process system exists on four levels: the resilience of the system
overall,  the resilience  of  individual  processes within the system, the  resilience  of
process instances and the resilience of individual constituent  services. In achieving
resilience one would certainly require  that  failures  at  a  lower  level  have  minimal
impact  on  the  higher  layers,  but  the  failure  forms  do  inform the  achievement  of
resilience at a higher layer.
In  this  paper,  resilience  of  the  federated  collaborative  process  systems  can  be
defined as adaptive capacity and its ability to cope with, adapt to and recover after a
disruption or failure. Thus we first look at failure model in Section 4.1 as well as
service  resilience  (Section  4.2),  process  instance  resilience  (Section  4.3),  process
resilience (Section 4.4) and overall resilience (Section 4.5) respectively.  
4.1 Failure modes
The various process system aspects can fail in various ways, but they share many
aspects of the ways in which they can fail. For the purposes of resilience, only the
external  aspects  of  failures  are  of  interest.  We are  also  looking at  failure  from a
software  perspective,  where  manufacturing  failure  modes  inform  the  perspective
taken, but are not sufficient to analyze interactions across levels of resilience or the
kinds of systems. Overall we distinguish the following orthogonal dimensions (please
note that these are not exclusive):
 Temporal  failure:  Along  the  time dimension  a  failure  can  be  temporary  (an
independent temporary event, for example a network failure due to a power cut);
failures  can  be  intermittent  based  on  a  systematic  issue  (related  failures  for
example due to insufficient  capacity during nightly batch operations);  Failures
can also be permanent (the company providing the service has seized operation).
 Failure detectability: Some failures are easy to recognize such as those where
error messages are provided, signaled failure. Other failures are detectable based
on business rules or SLA's such as failure to respond within a certain time period,
detectable failure.  The final  category of failure detection is are silent  failures
either in silent non-performance (ie. the request is accepted but never actioned),
silent partial-performance (ie. some aspects of the request are not performed, but
those  aspects  performed  are  valid.  The  final  form  of  silent  failure  is  silent
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corruption where the system provides incorrect state or results without signaling
any error.
 Partial failure: Partial failure concerns the degree to which the system is failing.
Full failure is a possibility, but partial failure can occur in various forms such as
degraded performance (eg. not meeting time expectations), reduced quality (the
results are valid but not of the quality or precision normally provided, the range
of the function is reduced) or  reduced provision (the domain or  image of the
functionality is reduced, ie. not all inputs are supported, for example a weather
service would have reduced provision for an area if the weather station in that
area was unavailable for some reason).
 Failure origin: The origin of a failure can either be internal as in it is caused by
issues within the logic control of a system, or external where the failure is outside
of the control  of  the system. An internal  failure  could be  a bug in a  service
implementation or process description. A bug in the process management system
would be external from the perspective of a process. A network failure that causes
a service to be unavailable would be external to that service. Both examples can,
in circumstances, be seen as internal to the overall system. An internal failure can
either be a  delegate failure (a used component causes the problem) or a  direct
failure where  the  problem  is  not  fundamentally  in  the  delegate  (although  a
delegate may return unexpected (but not invalid) results that trigger the issue).
4.2 Service resilience
Services form the building blocks of a SOA based process system. The causes of their
failures are therefore out of scope of this discussion, but they may exhibit all forms of
these failures. These failures do impact the overarching resilience levels however as
for the system to work, the failures need to be able to be handled.
4.3 Process instance resilience
Process instance resilience relates to how process instances can recover from failures.
In this aspect, direct failures are normally due to incorrect assumptions or pure logic
errors  (bugs  in  the  process  model),  and  of  less  interest  within  the  resilience
discussion.
From a temporal dimension perspective, process instances are, due to their inherent
nature as long-running, reasonably resilient to non-permanent failures. The lower the
pressure on timing, the stronger the resilience.
From a detectability perspective, only signaled failures are normally handled by
process  instances,  and  higher  resilience  generally  implies  more  complete  failure
management, that includes the availability of sufficient semantic information such as
to  allow  automatic  restarts  or  rerouting  for  failed  paths/components.  Silent  non-
performance can possibly be handled through monitoring and timeouts, but in many
cases cannot be distinguished from other forms of silent failure.
In terms of partial failure, degraded performance may lead to timing issues on the
process instance,  but  otherwise should not impact the performance of the process.
Reduced quality of performance leads to reduced quality of the instance, and reduced
Resilience Analysis of SOA based Collaborative Process Systems7
provision would lead to some instances failing (those affected by the reduction) and
some succeeding.
In  relation  to  the  location  of  failure,  external  failure  is  normally  failure  of
delegates/activities,  but  can  also  be  a  failure  in  the  execution  environment  (eg.
hardware  failure). External  failure  of  the  execution  environment  could  be
compensated  by  regular  replication  solutions  for  the  state  of  the  execution
environment (eg. database replication / sharding etc.) that is not specific to process
management.  In  terms of  direct  failure,  there  are  two aspects  to  the  resilience  of
process models. First is the ability of humans to interject  in process instances and
possibly  modify  them  or  provide  "missing"  data,  this  mainly  a  property  of  the
management system and the used process language. The other aspect is the frequency
of instances. In other words, while it may be technically feasible to intervene in a
process instance and recover it, it may not be feasible for large amounts of instances
that failed due to fundamentally the same cause.
4.4 Process resilience
The resilience of processes is strongly related to the resilience of process instances.
There  are  however  ways  in  which  the  execution  system  can  make  processes  be
resilient even when individual instances fail. Conversely, timing and speed issues that
are not problematic at instance level, may become so at process level.
Process  resilience  at  a  temporal  level  requires  monitoring  and  (pre-emptive)
intervention and/or rerouting. Processes are resilient when it is easy to (automatically)
replace  the  providers  of  services  for  the  process  (activity  execution  or  process
management),  but  it  requires  a  resilient  system  to  actually  make  use  of  those
possibilities. Obviously if these measures can be performed on already started process
instances, this would even be better.
At process level,  the detectability of failures is limited to the ability to express
overall expectations,  possibly at aggregate level. These process level specifications
could then allow for pre-emptive intervention in the instantiation of new processes.
Note that at process or system level it may also be feasible to determine some degree
of likelihood of the various forms of silent failure by aggregating monitoring data and
linking it to the expectations.
At process level partial failure of some instances would constitute partial failure of
the process. A resilient process would allow the instance failures to be minimized and
possibly corrected through re-execution along an alternative path. To do the latter,
does require sufficient information to be available for the process components to be
able to determine the semantic validity of doing so.
Locus  of  failure  at  process  level  implies  some  degree  of  process  quality
requirements as well as designs that minimize the impact of external failures. Again,
monitoring  of  individual  service  and  instance  performance  can  help  in  detecting,
mitigating and avoiding these failures or transitioning them from non-performance to
degraded performance by for example choosing a lower quality service that does not
have availability issues.
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4.5 Overall resilience
Overall  the  entire  systems  resilience  is  a  combination  of  the  resilience  of  the
constituting processes. Many measures at overall level can however help to achieve
this  resilience.  In  particular  the  provision  of  fallback  execution  environments  or
services will improve the overall resilience of the system. Resilience in terms of fault
tolerance mainly depends on the resilience of the components (services,  processes)
and sufficient provision of execution environments without single point of failure.
5 Resilience for federated process management
Where the previous section discussed the resilience of the components that make up a
federated process management system that is on a technical level rather than a utility
level. The possibilities of federated process management can, on a theoretical level be
seen as a subset of what single entity-controlled process management provides. on a
practical level, there are resilience benefits to federated process execution (there are
also  disadvantages  in  complexity  and  management).  In  addition,  in  real-world
business scenarios it is often not desirable to have centralized process control.
In terms of resilience, federated process management means that by implication,
processes are managed by multiple independent execution environments. While these
environments may have access  to different components (such as company internal
services) they would have similar orchestration capabilities. As federated processes
allow parts of execution to be delegated to other execution environments this means
that  an  overall  master  coordinator  does  not  require  direct  access  to  all  required
components for process execution.
At system and process level, through a lack of single point of failure and lack of
global  coordination  requirement,  federation  provides  a  strong  level  of  resilience
against total failure. Performance degradation, especially non-functional degradation,
can be compensated for by additional provisioning elsewhere within the collaboration.
Even the absence of certain unique resources, would only result in those processes
being unavailable.
The services used by a system are independent of the form of process management,
and  their  resilience  is  mainly  a  property  that  influences  higher  levels.  Federation
however brings some interesting perspectives  to process instance resilience. In the
case of sequential federation, given a well-defined ownership transition model, the
failure of preceding execution environments would not lead to instance failure. 
Within  hierarchical  federation  it  is  possible  that,  beside  the  master  execution
environment  multiple  delegate  environments  are  active  concurrently.  Fallback,  if
semantically valid within the process, would however still be possible as long as a
strict order of fallbacks is known by all candidates. These candidates would also be
required to have some degree of overall knowledge of the process, possibly under
some sort of escrow approach.
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6 Conclusion
From  the  discussion  above,  it  is  clear  that  beyond  meeting  business  needs  in
providing the benefits of collaboration while safeguarding independence of control,
federated  process  environments  also  bring  interesting  resilience  properties.  In
particular, the independence  of execution environments prevents  the full  failure at
system level in the case of failure of individual execution environments. At process
level,  full  failure  is  limited  to  those  cases  where  no  fallback  to  a  component  is
available (a unique, mandatory, service only provided by a single partner). Instance
resilience  is  no  longer  restricted  to  an  ability  to  work  around  failure  of  single
components, but also handle failure of execution environments.
Process resilience, in federated and other forms, does however require processes to
be designed for resilience, to have additional information that specifies the semantic
validity of cancellation and retries, and for there to be good, shared, monitoring of
component performance and reliability.
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